On May 12, the Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County granted a debt collector’s motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging violations of the FDCPA, ruling that common law standing (rather than statutory standing) governed the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims and that, because the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury-in-fact, the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff alleged that the debt collector violated § 1692f(8) of the FDCPA by mailing a collection envelope for a healthcare-related debt that displayed a string of numbers, a QR code, and a barcode — markings beyond the sender’s name and address. The plaintiff sought only statutory damages under the FDCPA and did not allege any actual damages from the envelope’s contents. The court had previously denied an earlier motion to dismiss in June 2025 but stayed the case pending the Illinois Supreme Court’s resolution of a standing question in a separate FCRA case. Following that decision, issued in November 2025 (covered by InfoBytes here), holding that common law standing principles, not statutory standing, govern claims brought under the FCRA in Illinois state courts, the court lifted the stay and granted the defendant’s renewed motion.

Applying the 2025 state supreme court decision, the court found that the FDCPA’s liability and jurisdiction provisions mirror those of the FCRA, noting that both statutes use passive language (i.e., “[a]n action to enforce … may be brought”) without expressly conferring a right of action on any particular person. Applying the 2025 state supreme court framework, the court noted the contrast drawn in that decision between the FCRA’s passive language and Illinois statutes such as the Biometric Information Privacy Act and the Probate Act, which expressly grant standing to aggrieved persons or interested parties. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that § 1692k(a)(2)’s categories of damages constitute enabling language conferring statutory standing, finding that the provision still does not expressly state who can bring a cause of action. Because the FDCPA, like the FCRA, lacks such enabling language, the court concluded that common law standing applies, requiring a plaintiff to allege an injury that is “distinct and palpable,” “fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions,” and “substantially likely” to be redressed by the requested relief. Finding that the plaintiff alleged only a procedural violation without any concrete injury, the court dismissed the case.