On March 7, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent DOGE from accessing Treasury payment records containing confidential personal information. The court found the plaintiffs, whose members receive payments from the federal government, did not meet the “‘high standard’ of showing a likelihood of an irreparable injury that is ‘beyond remediation.’” Clearing this standard, among other elements, was necessary to satisfy the test for injunctive relief; however, the court did not reach these other elements — i.e., likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of equities, and whether the injunction is in the public interest — arguing its analysis “begins and ends with irreparable harm.”

The defendants, who are officers of the United States, argued the plaintiffs’ motion should be denied because: (i) the plaintiffs lack Article III standing; and (ii) the U.S. has sovereign immunity ­— which shields the U.S. and its officers, agencies and instrumentalities from suit unless the plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of a statutory waiver of that immunity. The court rejected both arguments, finding that the plaintiffs have associational standing on behalf of their members and further determining that the relief sought by the plaintiffs falls within the statutory waiver.

Nonetheless, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. The court reasoned that while “the privacy harms asserted by the plaintiffs are real . . . , those asserted harms are not necessarily irreparable.” The plaintiffs asserted two harms: first, that DOGE shared their confidential information without their consent; and second, that there is a “nonspeculative risk” DOGE will disseminate their personal information to outside parties. The court rejected both arguments, finding that nonpublic disclosure is not an irreparable injury and that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof that dissemination was likely. The court emphasized that injunctive relief “will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time.”