

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

APR 23 2021

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

B.F.; A.A., minors, by and through their
guardian Joey Fields; C.O., a minor, by and
through her guardian Alison O'Neil,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

AMAZON.COM INC, a Delaware
corporation; A2Z DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 20-35359

D.C. No.
2:19-cv-00910-RAJ-MLP

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 2, 2021
San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and EATON,** Judge,
United States Court of International Trade.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.

In this case, Plaintiffs are minor children who allege that Amazon’s Alexa service has intercepted or recorded their communications without their consent, in violation of various state-wiretapping laws. Amazon now appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). We review de novo, *Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc.*, 771 F.3d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), and affirm.

The basis of Amazon’s motion to compel is the arbitration agreements entered into by Plaintiffs’ parents when they activated their Amazon accounts and the Alexa service. It is undisputed that, if the parents brought the same claims as Plaintiffs, the terms to which they agreed would bind them to arbitration. Thus, the sole issue is whether the Plaintiffs, as non-signatories, are nonetheless bound to arbitrate. We apply state law to answer that question. *Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle*, 556 U.S. 624, 630–31 (2009). The parties agree that Washington law applies.

Generally, non-signatories are not bound by a contract’s arbitration clause because “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” *Satomi Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, LLC*, 167 Wash. 2d 781, 810 (2009) (en banc) (quoting *Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). Nonetheless, there are limited exceptions to this general rule. *Id.*

One such exception is equitable estoppel, which “precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the

burdens that contract imposes.” *Townsend v. Quadrant Corp.*, 173 Wash. 2d 451, 461 (2012) (en banc) (simplified). In other words, when a person “knowingly exploits” a contract containing an arbitration clause, the person can be compelled to arbitrate despite having never signed the agreement. *Id.* (quoting *Mundi v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co.*, 555 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009)).

The Washington Supreme Court’s application of this rule in *Townsend* compels our conclusion. There, several plaintiff-homeowners brought suit against the corporation that had constructed and sold them their homes, alleging that construction defects resulted in personal injuries resulting from mold, pests, and poisonous gases. *Id.* at 453–54. Their claims, brought individually and on behalf of their minor children, were for outrage, fraud, unfair business practices, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, rescission, and breach of warranty. *Id.* at 454–55. Pursuant to the purchase agreement between the homeowners and the corporation, the corporation moved to compel arbitration. *Id.* The question that divided the Washington Supreme Court was similar to the one presented here: whether the non-signatory children were bound to arbitrate their claims. *Id.* at 460.

A majority of the Court held that the children were not bound to arbitrate. *See id.* at 465–66 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To be sure, “a party who knowingly exploits a contract for benefit cannot simultaneously avoid the burden of arbitrating.” *Id.* at 464. But a non-signatory does not knowingly exploit

the contract when they bring claims that “do not arise out of the contract”—that is, when the non-signatory brings claims that “sound in tort and allege personal injuries.” *Id.* at 465 Thus, because the children in *Townsend* were asserting claims based on “an independent duty” that did not “arise from” the agreement containing the arbitration clause, they were not bound to arbitrate. *Id.*¹

The same is true here. Plaintiffs are not asserting any right or looking to enforce any duty created by the contracts between their parents and Amazon. Instead, Plaintiffs bring only state statutory claims that do not depend on their parents’ contracts. In other words, irrespective of those agreements, Amazon would owe to Plaintiffs the legal duty that Plaintiffs claim has been violated. *See David Terry Invs., LLC-PRC v. Headwaters Dev. Grp. Ltd. Liab. Co.*, 13 Wash. App. 2d 159, 170 (2020) (applying *Townsend* and explaining that a non-signatory is not bound to arbitrate when they assert rights that arise “wholly independent” of the contract containing the arbitration clause).

¹ The Washington Supreme Court’s unconventional practices have caused some confusion in this case. In *Townsend*, the “lead” opinion, which was delivered by Justice Alexander, held that the plaintiff children were bound to arbitrate. *Townsend*, 173 Wash. 2d. at 461–62 (lead opinion). Justice Stephens’s “concurring/dissenting” opinion held that the children were not bound to arbitrate. *Id.* at 465 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because Justice Stephen’s opinion received five votes—a majority of the Court—it constitutes the majority opinion even though it is not the “lead” opinion. *See In re Det. of Reyes*, 184 Wash. 2d 340, 346 (2015) (“A principle of law reached by a majority of the court, even in a fractured opinion, is not considered a plurality but rather binding precedent.”).

Amazon alternatively argues that we should compel arbitration based on what it calls the “intertwined” or “close-relationship” theory of estoppel. This theory fails.

Amazon does not cite, and we have not found, any Washington case applying this theory of estoppel. Moreover, this theory is generally only used by non-signatories to bind signatories to arbitration, not the reverse. For instance, to support its use of close-relationship estoppel, Amazon relies on our decision in *Mundi*. But there, we explained that under this theory “a *signatory* may be required to arbitrate a claim brought by a nonsignatory because of the close relationship between the entities involved.” *Mundi*, 555 F.3d at 1046 (emphasis added) (simplified); *see also David Terry Invs., LLC-PRC*, 13 Wash. App. 2d at 171 (“Courts applying equitable estoppel against a *signatory* have looked to the relationships of persons, wrongs and issues, in particular whether the claims that the *nonsignatory* sought to arbitrate were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.”) (emphasis added) (simplified). Accordingly, Amazon as a signatory cannot use this theory—which Washington has not explicitly recognized—to bind Plaintiffs who are non-signatories.

AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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Information Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings

Judgment

- This Court has filed and entered the attached judgment in your case. Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please note the filed date on the attached decision because all of the dates described below run from that date, not from the date you receive this notice.

Mandate (Fed. R. App. P. 41; 9th Cir. R. 41-1 & -2)

- The mandate will issue 7 days after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing or 7 days from the denial of a petition for rehearing, unless the Court directs otherwise. To file a motion to stay the mandate, file it electronically via the appellate ECF system or, if you are a pro se litigant or an attorney with an exemption from using appellate ECF, file one original motion on paper.

Petition for Panel Rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40; 9th Cir. R. 40-1)

Petition for Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1 to -3)

(1) A. Purpose (Panel Rehearing):

- A party should seek panel rehearing only if one or more of the following grounds exist:
 - ▶ A material point of fact or law was overlooked in the decision;
 - ▶ A change in the law occurred after the case was submitted which appears to have been overlooked by the panel; or
 - ▶ An apparent conflict with another decision of the Court was not addressed in the opinion.
- Do not file a petition for panel rehearing merely to reargue the case.

B. Purpose (Rehearing En Banc)

- A party should seek en banc rehearing only if one or more of the following grounds exist:

- ▶ Consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the Court's decisions; or
- ▶ The proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance; or
- ▶ The opinion directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another court of appeals or the Supreme Court and substantially affects a rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for national uniformity.

(2) Deadlines for Filing:

- A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
- If the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party in a civil case, the time for filing a petition for rehearing is 45 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
- If the mandate has issued, the petition for rehearing should be accompanied by a motion to recall the mandate.
- *See* Advisory Note to 9th Cir. R. 40-1 (petitions must be received on the due date).
- An order to publish a previously unpublished memorandum disposition extends the time to file a petition for rehearing to 14 days after the date of the order of publication or, in all civil cases in which the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party, 45 days after the date of the order of publication. 9th Cir. R. 40-2.

(3) Statement of Counsel

- A petition should contain an introduction stating that, in counsel's judgment, one or more of the situations described in the "purpose" section above exist. The points to be raised must be stated clearly.

(4) Form & Number of Copies (9th Cir. R. 40-1; Fed. R. App. P. 32(c)(2))

- The petition shall not exceed 15 pages unless it complies with the alternative length limitations of 4,200 words or 390 lines of text.
- The petition must be accompanied by a copy of the panel's decision being challenged.
- An answer, when ordered by the Court, shall comply with the same length limitations as the petition.
- If a pro se litigant elects to file a form brief pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-1, a petition for panel rehearing or for rehearing en banc need not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 32.

- The petition or answer must be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance found at Form 11, available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under *Forms*.
- You may file a petition electronically via the appellate ECF system. No paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise. If you are a pro se litigant or an attorney exempted from using the appellate ECF system, file one original petition on paper. No additional paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise.

Bill of Costs (Fed. R. App. P. 39, 9th Cir. R. 39-1)

- The Bill of Costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
- See Form 10 for additional information, available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under *Forms*.

Attorneys Fees

- Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1 describes the content and due dates for attorneys fees applications.
- All relevant forms are available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under *Forms* or by telephoning (415) 355-7806.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

- Please refer to the Rules of the United States Supreme Court at www.supremecourt.gov

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- If there are any errors in a published opinion, please send a letter **in writing within 10 days** to:
 - ▶ Thomson Reuters; 610 Opperman Drive; PO Box 64526; Eagan, MN 55123 (Attn: Jean Green, Senior Publications Coordinator);
 - ▶ and electronically file a copy of the letter via the appellate ECF system by using “File Correspondence to Court,” or if you are an attorney exempted from using the appellate ECF system, mail the Court one copy of the letter.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Form 10. Bill of Costs**

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